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Are historians ontological realists? An exchange
Herman Paula and Ethan Kleinbergb
aInstitute for History, Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands; bCollege of Letters/History
Department, Wesleyan University, Connecticut, Middletown, USA
ABSTRACT
This is an exchange between Herman Paul and Ethan Kleinberg on Kleinberg’s
book, Haunting History. The exchange revolves around the question: Are
historians ‘ontological realists’? That is, do historians generally take the past
to be a ﬁxed and immutable object – ‘deﬁnitive, knowable, and stable’? Paul
argues that historians do not necessarily hold consistent ontological beliefs.
When facing the specter of Derridean deconstructivism, they may well invoke
the image of a ﬁxed, immutable past. But this does not imply that historians
are ontological realists on all occasions: it is well possible that they respond
quite diﬀerently to old-fashioned positivists than to Foucault- or Derrida-
inspired theorists of history. In his rejoinder to Paul, Kleinberg argues that
the ontological realist position historians hold is more stable than their con-
text-speciﬁc commitments might suggest. This can be seen in response to the
perceived threat of French theory in general and deconstruction in particular
but also in the published works of most academic history. He contends that if
Swidler’s concept of ‘cultural vocabularies’ is apt in regard to these speciﬁc
commitments, as Paul suggests, it demonstrates the inadequacy of the onto-
logical realist approach to the past and precisely why historians should look to
a deconstructive one.
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Part I: Herman Paul reading Ethan Kleinberg
Introduction
When Hayden White was still alive and teaching at Stanford in the early
2000s, I once heard a graduate student chatting with White after class,
trying to distill out of his teacher some thoughts about originality in the
humanities. White’s recipe turned out to be simple: ‘Read two books at the
same time and see what happens’. Following this advice, I have read Ethan
Kleinberg’s Haunting History in tandem with a book that covers quite
diﬀerent ground: Ann Swidler’s Talk of Love. One is a treatise on decon-
struction in history, the other a book on what Americans understand love
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to mean. It remains to be seen whether my combined reading of these
studies will yield any original insight, as White seemed to promise. But at
least the exercise allows for some reﬂection on a question that becomes
more urgent now that White, unfortunately, is no longer among us: How
long and in what way do we historical theorists want to continue the
‘metahistorical’ paradigm exempliﬁed by Metahistory (White 1973)?
Consequently, the comments that follow should not be mistaken for a book
review. They rather seek to start a conversation between two authors whom I
greatly admire: a historical theorist working broadly within the Whitean para-
digm and a cultural sociologist best known for her contributions to cultural
repertoire theory. I would propose their conversation to zoom in on a particular
claim made in Kleinberg’s book: the claim that most historians are ‘ontological
realists’ in the sense that they believe the past to be a ﬁxed and immutable object –
‘deﬁnitive, knowable, and stable’ (Kleinberg 2017, 1, 128).
My question is: When and under what circumstances do historians describe
the past as ‘deﬁnitive, knowable, and stable’? If they do so in response to a
perceived threat known as ‘deconstruction’, ‘Foucault’ or ‘Derrida’, as
Kleinberg shows in his chapter on American historians’ reception of French
theory, what, if anything, do such context-speciﬁc invocations of an ontologically
stable past tell us about historians’ ontological commitments in other profes-
sional contexts, such as teaching undergraduate classes, supervising PhD
research, writing interdisciplinary grant applications and explaining the value
of historical studies in a newspaper op-ed? Do such ontological statements reveal
‘assumptions in the current practice of history’ that are stable across contexts, as
Kleinberg seems to suggest (Kleinberg 2017, 72), or should they be interpreted in
more contextual terms, as claims that ‘work’ in speciﬁc rhetorical or discursive
situations, but don’t necessarily fare well in other contexts?
Cultural vocabularies
Swidler’s Talk of Love is a sociological study of what love means to Americans
from various age groups and social backgrounds. One of the book’s most
fascinating passages revolves around an interview held with an engineer named
Donald Nelson. During the ﬁrst full hour of the interview, the man deﬁnes love
consistently in terms of mutual respect, that is, in terms of mutual acceptance of
diﬀerences – ‘not trying, for example, to convert one’s spouse to one’s religious
beliefs or interfere with the other person’s activities’ (Swidler 2001, 31). ‘The
greatest virtue in marriage is giving the other person freedom to do what he or
she wants, and the cardinal sin is denying that freedom’ (32). But when the
interviewer askswhatDonaldwould do if Nora, his wife, would become seriously
ill, he suddenly adopts a very diﬀerent tone: ‘Nora is the most important thing in
my life’, ‘I love her’. And that means: sacriﬁcing freedom, interests and hobbies
for the sake of helpingNora. ‘If you love [someone] . . . it is just something you do
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for them. It’s something you want to do’ (32). This clearly draws on a diﬀerent
understanding of love, focused not on freedom and respect but on help and self-
sacriﬁce. How do these two go together?
Swidler is interested in such shifts between frames or ‘cultural vocabul-
aries’, as she calls them, not because she thinks they reveal inconsistencies
in people’s beliefs about love, but because she thinks diﬀerent vocabularies
serve diﬀerent purposes. I quote:
The frame that worked very well to describe what [Donald] values most about
his marriage – the mutual respect of two autonomous individuals – broke
down, or perhaps we should say it fell silent, before the problem of desperate
dependence. His language of ‘respect’ . . . was never meant to handle a situation
of decisive choice. When the vocabulary of respect failed him, an entirely
diﬀerent moral vision was available in reserve. (Swidler 2001, 33)
According to Swidler, this shows something more general about what
culture is and how it works. Arguing against a dominant Weberian tradi-
tion in twentieth-century sociology that deﬁnes culture in terms of values or
ideologies – what people do is dictated by their values – Swidler thinks that
culture is more like a toolkit, on which people draw selectively as the
situation requires. Following this line of reasoning, Donald’s talk of love
should not be understood as expressing stable commitments to values like
freedom, loyalty and care. Rather, Donald draws on a variety of culturally
available resources, thereby suggesting that some situations require diﬀerent
sorts of conduct than others.
Talk of history
I don’t know of a historiographical equivalent to Talk of Love – a volume
entitled Talk of History, for instance. But the case of Donald Nelson
reminds me of John Pocock, whom Kleinberg invokes in his ﬁrst chapter
as a spokesman for ontological realism. Based on a 1986 article of Pocock,
directed against historians trying to become French- or German-style
intellectuals (Pocock 1986), Kleinberg argues that Pocock sought to exorcise
such ‘evil spirits’ as Foucault and Derrida from the house of history in order
to preserve that house for ‘working historians’ with ontological realist
conceptions of a stable past (Kleinberg 2017, 27). What Kleinberg does
not mention is that Pocock on other occasions chose to say quite diﬀerent
things. In dialogue with political theorists, for instance, Pocock could be
heard saying that the past is never ‘over and done with’, that ancient texts
have a surplus of meaning, allowing them to reemerge with sometimes
unexpected force in the here and now, ‘reminding us that there is always
more going on than we can comprehend at any one moment and convert
into their theory or practice’. Here, the past appears as anything but stable:
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what is past or present about, say, Machiavelli cannot, in Pocock’s words,
‘be deﬁned with ﬁnality’ – a term that almost seems borrowed from
deconstructivist discourse (Pocock 2008, 172).
I’m not sure how Kleinberg would make sense of this apparent incon-
sistency in Pocock’s ontological statements. Yet I think I know what Swidler
would say. She would welcome it as another illustration of the central idea
of her book: culture is not a matter of holding consistent views about the
world. Culture rather consists of attitudes and skills that enable people to
draw on multiple repertoires, depending on the situations in which they
ﬁnd themselves. Although it is true that many key words or phrases in
historians’ vocabularies are charged with ontological meaning – think of
‘facts’ or ‘reconstruction of the past’ – historians resemble other human
beings in using diﬀerent idioms, with diﬀerent ontological connotations,
often without much worry about philosophical consistency. If they read
and, most likely, fail to understand Derrida, they respond diﬀerently, in
terms of other vocabularies or repertoires, than they do to Ranke’s wie es
eigenlich gewesen (with all the Idealist metaphysics implied in that phrase).
So, if Kleinberg examines how historians respond to Foucault, Derrida
and their apostles in the US, he is studying historians’ discourse in a setting
where, indeed, ontological realist assumptions are frequently invoked.
Faced with intellectuals perceived as embodying the specter of ‘relativism’,
historians take recourse to ontological realism. However, if Swidler is right
about the context-speciﬁcity of such discourse, this analysis does not tell us
very much about how those same historians would respond to, for example,
Langlois’s and Seignobos’s Introduction aux études historiques (1898) – a
late nineteenth-century textbook now generally conceived as very old fash-
ioned in its positivist fetishism of sources. Indeed, following Swidler, it is
not inconceivable that historians commenting on this textbook would adopt
stances much closer to Foucault, stressing that historians make their ‘facts
of the past’ at least as much as they ﬁnd them.
Ontological realism
Although I expect Kleinberg to be sympathetic to this line of reasoning, I
can imagine him raising an objection. While it seems plausible that histor-
ians adopt diﬀerent idioms in teaching a ﬁrst-year course on historical
method, in delivering a conference paper at the Sixteenth-Century Studies
Conference and in explaining at a cocktail party why society needs histor-
ical studies, some cultural vocabularies circulating among historians seem
more context-speciﬁc than others. Arguably, methodological language is
most likely to vary across situations, if only because the jargon employed
in articles on ‘emotional regimes’ in postcolonial India is often as unin-
telligible to ﬁrst-year history students as it is to colleagues outside of the
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humanities. Epistemological repertoires may vary, too. In order to make
sense of their ‘epistemological uncertainty’ (Kleinberg 2017, 2), historians
metaphorically explain their work through images as diﬀerent as a ‘puzzle’,
a ‘story’ and a ‘dialogue’. Ontological repertoires, on the other hand, do not
seem to come in great numbers. Isn’t ontological realism ‘the position that
most conventional historians hold’ (2), simply because the historical pro-
fession has traditionally positioned itself as a guardian of the ‘real’ over and
against neighboring ﬁelds perceived as indulging in ‘hypothesizing’, ‘theo-
rizing’ and ‘speculating’ (I am exaggerating only slightly)?
In my imagination, I see Swidler nodding enthusiastically, but also
eagerly waiting to add two further complications. One is that ‘ontological
realism’ might be a bit too broad a term to describe historians’ ontological
commitments with suﬃcient precision. Perhaps ‘ontological realism’ seems
to reign supreme only because it is an umbrella category that lumps
together a variety of ways in which historians perceive ‘real’ and ‘stable’
as meaningful attributes of their pasts – especially if ‘realism’, like ‘relati-
vism’, is employed for polemical purposes. Second, even if it is the case that
most historians, when pressed, would admit that the past is ‘ﬁxed’ or
‘stable’, what diﬀerence would that make to their actual work in the various
contexts mentioned above? Doesn’t Kleinberg’s opening chapter – an inter-
esting, but methodologically quite conventional piece of intellectual his-
tory – add credence to the view that historical competence is primarily a
matter of skillfully applying certain hermeneutical tools, irrespective of their
original ontological connotations and the metaphysical ‘positions’ held by
their users (if these have any ‘positions’ at all)?1
Conclusion
At this point, the conversation seems to reach a certain impasse, mainly
because of all the hypothetical adverbs (‘perhaps’) and conditional clauses
(‘if’) that begin to dominate both Swidler’s and Kleinberg’s language. It is
one thing to assume that historians say diﬀerent things in diﬀerent contexts,
but quite another to substantiate this claim with empirical evidence.
Embarrassing as it may sound, such empirical studies are nearly absent:
there are hardly any studies telling us how academic historians teach, how
they write grant proposals or even how they conduct archival research.2 If a
surprised Swidler were to inquire into what kind of research historical
theorists typically engage, the honest answer would be that most of them
don’t do much empirical research. Insofar as historians and their work are
subjected to empirical analysis, it is only their published work that receives
attention, usually from historical theorists who follow White in asking
‘metahistorical’ questions about ontological and epistemological ‘assump-
tions’ or ‘commitments’ to political and aesthetic values.
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Analogous to the story of Weber’s legacy in American sociology, then,
Swidler might ask Kleinberg whether some kind of Weberian ghost is
haunting historical theory – partly perhaps through Hayden White’s far-
reaching inﬂuence. As I have argued elsewhere, the kind of historiographi-
cal analysis practiced in Metahistory drew heavily on White’s historical
work from the 1950s, central to which were Weberian categories of analysis
(Paul 2011). Ever since White, historical theorists have favored ‘views’ and
‘positions’ over practices and performances. They have privileged questions
of ideology, value and Weltanschauung over those of habit, routine and
practice. The dominance of this metahistorical paradigm (in which
Kleinberg also inscribes himself) may help explain why a praxeological
alternative has never really taken oﬀ.
So, by way of conclusion, I can imagine a theme issue of, say, Rethinking
History, co-edited by Kleinberg and Swidler, devoted to exploring the pros
and cons of a praxeological paradigm in historical theory, focused on the
demands that diﬀerent types of practices make upon historians in terms of
their methodology, their language, their virtues (if I may throw in that one)
and their ontology. I can imagine Swidler writing an opening piece on
Weber’s legacy in twentieth-century historical theory. I can imagine several
case study articles, exploring how historians in diﬀerent circumstances draw
on diﬀerent repertoires and how, vice versa, diﬀerent ontological commit-
ments are seldom a barrier for fruitful collaboration. Yet I’m still curious
about the title of Kleinberg's concluding remarks. ‘The Praxeological
Fallacy’, perhaps? Or will he join the praxeological turn and write an article
as fresh and stimulating as his newest book, entitled ‘How Realism
Resembles Love: Ontological Repertoires in Historical Studies?’
Part II: Ethan Kleinberg responding to Herman Paul
Introduction
Thinking about Herman Paul’s evocation of Hayden White and the radical
contingency of reading ‘two books at the same time’ to see what happens, I
began to wonder what would have happened had Paul chosen Dostoevsky’s The
Brothers Karamazov or Bourdieu’sHomoAcademicus. Something quite diﬀerent
I suspect. But I also suspect that Paul’s decision to pair Haunting History with
Swidler’s Talk of Love was more calculated and deliberate than the reference to
White suggests. At least the ﬁnished product appears that way as Paul is able to
marshal the work of Swidler to raise some important questions about my book
and the theory of history. In this sense, the conversation is really between three
authors not two and it is a pleasure to engagewith Swidler, an author I too greatly
admire, and a scholar as erudite, precise and intellectually generous as Paul. I plan
to approach this ‘conversation’ from two directions. The ﬁrst to answer themore
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speciﬁc questions about ontological realism, themetahistorical paradigm and the
Weberian approach. The second to argue that if Swidler’s concept of ‘cultural
vocabularies’ is apt, as Paul suggests, it demonstrates the inadequacy of the
ontological realist approach to the past and precisely why historians should
look to a deconstructive one.
I will bracket the overarching question Paul asks as to ‘how long and in what
way do we historical theorists want to continue the “metahistorical” paradigm
exempliﬁed by Metahistory?’ and instead begin with the more particular one
regarding ontological realism: ‘When and under what circumstances do histor-
ians describe the past as “deﬁnite, knowable, and stable”?’ Paul uses Swidler’s
‘cultural vocabularies’ to argue that the positions historians hold are context-
speciﬁc invocations, such that a historian confronting the philosophy of Derrida
or Foucault may well invoke an ontologically stable past but that same historian
confronting Langois and Seignobos could take the contradictory position that the
past lacks such stability. Following this logic, Paul speaking as Swidler suggests
that ontological realism might be ‘too broad a term to describe historian’s
ontological commitments with suﬃcient precision’. This is the concern with
what Paul sees as a Weberian approach where the focus on ideas and ideal types
loses track of the practices at play in particular contexts. Such practices lack the
consistency of the ideal type. Perhaps this is so, but let us take a moment to
answer the question as to when and under what circumstances historians
describe the past as deﬁnite, knowable and stable? One instance is surely in
response to the perceived threat of French theory in general and deconstruction
in particular as I demonstrate in the book. But another place one can see these
commitments is in the published works of most academic history. For the most
part, actually existing academic history promotes a disciplinary essentialism
founded upon a methodological fetishism which treats reiﬁed appearances (i.e.
immediately observable, preferably archival, evidence) as embodying the real and
containing the truth of social relations. Evaluation of scholarship is based on
whether this empiricist method has been capably employed and in this way the
commitment to ontological realism permeates all the practices of the discipline
suggested by Paul.3 Thus, I would like to ﬂip the question about when and under
what circumstances historians hold the ontological realist position to instead ask
when and under what circumstances they do not?
Ontological realism: weak, strong, enduring
In the book, I distinguish between a weaker and stronger variant of
ontological realism. The stronger variant adheres to the position that
there is a past and we can have full access to it; but, to my mind, this is a
position that no, or very few, working historians currently hold, even
though it seems to be the variant Paul targets. Instead, it is the weaker
variant that interests me, wherein the past is said to have an ontological
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reality but it is one we can only approach perspectivally and incompletely
from our position in the present, and thus with epistemological uncertainty
about that which is ontologically certain. This latter weaker variant is the
position that most conventional historians hold and allows for the contra-
dictions at work in the sorts of cultural vocabularies Paul describes. In the
book, I reference Alun Munslow’s observation that historians beholden to a
rather Rankean view of the past manage to maintain it while simultaneously
making concessions to philosophers or theorists of history. Most historians
are perfectly comfortable ceding points about the accessibility or stability of
the past to thinkers such as White, Dominick LaCapra, or Joan Scott but
then proceed with their historical work as though this doesn’t matter. This
might be the sort of contradiction at work in cultural vocabularies as
articulated by Swidler via Paul but I think it also important to point out
that such contradictions manage to maintain continuity insofar as the
concession to an unstable past is then followed by a narrative of stability
that eﬀaces the prior concession canceling out the contradiction as it were.
This is why I argue that the stronger version of ontological realism is always
at work unannounced in the weaker one. Historians are particularly adept
at oﬀering paradigms they know are unattainable and then eﬀacing those
aspects that expose the instability or limitations of their model.
Paul provides a series of quotes by Pocock that provide an excellent
example of why cultural vocabularies should not be seen as expressing
stable commitments but rather as a variety of culturally available resources
that are deployed diﬀerently depending on context and situation. Paul
juxtaposes a quote by Pocock that I use in the book to demonstrate his
unease and discomfort about deconstruction with another quote by Pocock,
responding to political theorists, that coincides with an understanding of
the past as radically unstable. Paul asks how I would make sense of the
apparent ‘inconsistency in Pocock’s ontological statements’. He then opines
that Swidler would take it as an illustration that culture is not a matter of
holding consistent views about the world but about the attitudes and skills
that enable people to draw on multiple repertoires depending on the
situation in which they ﬁnd themselves. I think this is likely correct,
although there does seem to be a way in which the contradictory positions
Pocock holds still manage to serve a larger ideal that likely would not be
seen by examining practices and instead requires a metahistorical view.
Nevertheless, for me, the issue in play was never really about whether
Pocock held consistent views but instead about why and how, for someone
like Pocock who does hold sophisticated views about the nature of the past,
deconstruction is a strategy that simply goes too far? Why, in the context of
confronting deconstruction, does Pocock take up the vocabulary of onto-
logical realism? Paul could have also used the even more striking example
of Hayden White of whom I ask the same question in regard to White’s
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article from 1976 where he presents deconstruction as the point of no
return, where ‘the ballet turns ghostly and all judgment, discrimination,
and perspective is lost’ (White 1978, 281).
So, on the one hand, I believe that most historians actually hold a more
consistent view of what the past is and how they approach it, even given the
inconsistencies in their distinct cultural vocabularies about it. And, on the
other hand, even those historians whose general approach would seem to
welcome deconstruction may be unable to do so, instead taking on posi-
tions and commitments aligned with ontological realism. I can see how
Paul would see this as evidence of the context-driven switching that Swidler
argues is at work in our everyday practices, but I believe it is worth asking
whether there is something more at play in the relation between decon-
struction and history. I will come back to this in the ﬁnal section.
Metahistory of praxeology
Paul next asks whether, even if it is the case that most historians, when
pressed, ‘would be prepared to admit that the past is “ﬁxed” or “stable,”
how much of a diﬀerence would that make for their actual work in the
various contexts mentioned above?’ In other words, so what? This is a
question I hear often and my response is that it does matter a lot because of
the ways that the ontological realist approach closes oﬀ the possibilities of
alternative logics of history, alternative voices and alternative pasts. This is
to argue that the sorts of practices that interest Paul are restricted when it
comes to the discipline of history and discriminatory in terms of which
types of practice are actually allowed into the discipline. Indeed, they are
suﬃciently discriminatory that I intentionally wrote the opening chapter of
Haunting History as a conventional intellectual history to ‘credential’ myself
in order to cut oﬀ one line of dismissal. When Paul asks: ‘Doesn’t
Kleinberg’s opening chapter – an interesting, but methodologically quite
conventional piece of intellectual history – add credence to the view that
historical competence is primarily a matter of skillfully applying certain
hermeneutical tools, irrespective of their original ontological connotations
and the metaphysical “positions” held by their users (if these have any
“positions” at all)?’, I would say no. ‘Historical competence’ invoked in this
speciﬁc context is a means of disciplining the author into a narrow band-
width of narrative, interpretative and rhetorical choices. Into choices that
are easily parroted to subversive ends in my case, as I think becomes
apparent in the discussion of presence and absence in the chapter under
consideration, and made explicit in the ﬁnal chapter on ‘The Past that Is’.
By now, it may be clear that I don’t see ontological realism as resembling
love at all. At least not Swidler’s account of it. But this does not lead me to
dismiss Swidler or Paul as some sort of ‘Praxeological Fallacy’. If I were to
554 H. PAUL AND E. KLEINBERG
follow Paul’s praxeological turn, it would be to investigate the practices of
disciplinary discrimination and the cultural vocabularies at work in this sort
of boundary building, although my sense is that this too would require the
retention of a metahistorical vantage as well as a praxeological one.
This leads me to my second approach to the ‘diﬀerent contexts, diﬀerent
repertoires’ at work in Paul’s comment. One question I have for Paul is
whether his invocation of the praxeological approach attuned to cultural
vocabularies is one he thinks applicable to historians for the practice of
history or solely to theorists and philosophers of history in their diagnosis
of what historians do? I ask this because if Paul, following Swidler, is right
in asserting that humans generally operate by means of context-speciﬁc
invocations that are routinely contradictory, then the ontological realist
approach employed in most conventional historical accounts would turn
out to be a particularly bad and misleading one. This is because the internal
logic of such an approach strives to paper over inconsistencies and contra-
dictions to produce a consistent and cohesive nature of the ‘past “as it really
was”, even if the full and complete truth about the past will always remain
beyond their grasp’ (Wood 2008, 60). By contrast, the deconstructive
approach is one that actively searches for such contradictions without the
compulsion to either reconcile or dismiss one in favor of another. In this
way, it is likely, by looking to the deconstructive approach to the past in
chapter ﬁve of my book (‘The Past that Is’) rather than the diagnosis of
ontological realism in chapter one, that Paul can ﬁnd a means of doing
history that accounts for the contradictory commitments and ensuing
cultural vocabularies he ﬁnds so attractive in the work of Swidler.
Conclusion
At this point, however, the conversation does indeed seem to reach an
impasse. Partly because of the reasons Paul suggests involving some kind
of Weberian ghost haunting historical theory through Hayden White’s
far-reaching inﬂuence and the emphasis on ‘views’ and ‘positions’ over
practices and performances. But also, I would argue, because of Paul’s
own overture to empirical studies which implies a search for ‘solid
answers’ as to how academic historians teach, how they write grant
proposals or even how they conduct archival research. I certainly don’t
think of Paul as a crude ontological realist and I welcome his position
because of his strong commitment to working out issues in a complex
and self-reﬂective way. But within the context of this exchange and his
argument about cultural vocabularies, I consider it likely that readers of
the exchange will see the call for empirical research as a response to the
instability of the past oﬀered in my own argument. This is to say that
just as my position is presented as linked to Weberian idealism, his will
RETHINKING HISTORY 555
be taken as the language of ontological realism where, to my mind, the
commitment to empirical data serves as a false ﬂoor to hold up the
assertion that such events are objectively and neutrally available for
discovery, description and interpretation. Here, we reach the impasse
or aporia in our exchange which is the stopping point for the ontological
realist but the opening for the deconstructivist. I would embrace Paul’s
praxeological turn precisely because of the ways it places the underlying
assumptions of the metahistorical approach in question. But I’m loathe to
do so if it simply means inverting the hierarchy and advancing practice
theory as the sole interpretative lens for theory of history. Especially
given the ways that under-examined practices are often taken as simple
and neutral instantiations of a given cultural context without reﬂection
on how they serve to form that context or restrict other practices that are
then taken to be unnatural. In this regard, I remain committed to the
metahistorical paradigm and the critical force it maintains. Thus, the sort
of deconstruction I would like to see in our imaginary theme issue is one
that places these two approaches in conversation so that we are forced to
confront and examine the contradictory cultural vocabularies at work in
each of them and what each exposes about the assumptions at work in
the other. Perhaps I would call my contribution ‘The practice of decon-
struction: a labor of love’.
Notes
1. My imaginary conversation is indebted to a real one at the American
Sociological Association annual meeting in Montreal, on 15 August 2017.
In a panel discussion of Abend (2014), Swidler made a case for interpret-
ing ethical language in praxeological instead of philosophical terms, that
is, with an eye to the purposes such language serves in actual practice
rather than with a focus on their philosophical presuppositions or
genealogies.
2. Ironically, the only exception that comes to mind – a sociological analysis of
how historians in grant committees deﬁne scholarly ‘excellence’ – has been
written by a former student of Swidler: Lamont (2010).
3. This formulation is taken from thesis I.2 of the Theses on Theory and History
(Kleinberg, Scott, and Wilder 2017).
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